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OCASIO v. UNITED STATES: WHY THE HOBBS ACT
PUNISHES CO-CONSPIRATOR EXTORTION
JOSHUA T. CARBACK ∗
State and local corruption is a national problem. 1 Over the past four
decades, the United States Department of Justice increased its efforts to
combat political corruption by using a variety of statutory tools, the most
important of which is the Hobbs Act. 2 Since the passage of the Hobbs Act,
the United States Supreme Court has broadened its interpretation of the
statute in response to prosecutorial innovation aimed at combatting political
corruption. 3 Ocasio v. United States 4 presents a case of great importance to
the Supreme Court’s Hobbs Act jurisprudence. 5 The case concerns
defendant Samuel L. Ocasio, a Baltimore police officer convicted of
violating the Hobbs Act by engaging in a kickback scheme. 6 The issue
currently on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether the Hobbs Act’s
anti-extortion provision, under which Ocasio was convicted, contemplates
acts directed against co-conspirators, or merely third parties outside of
criminal conspiracies.7 The text of the Hobbs Act, its legislative history,
and strong public policy considerations all support a broad construction of
its anti-extortion provision as encompassing co-conspirator extortion. 8
Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision, uphold Ocasio’s conviction, and
preserve the Justice Department’s ability to fight extortion of coconspirators with the Hobbs Act. 9
© 2016 Johua T. Carback.
∗
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1. Public Corruption: Why It’s Our #1 Criminal Priority, FBI (Mar. 26, 2010),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/march/corruption_032610.
As Federal Bureau of
Investigation Public Corruption/Civil Rights Program Assistant Section Chief Patrick Bohrer
explains, public corruption is the agency’s primary investigative priority: the agency investigates a
gamut of activities including, “extortion, embezzlement, racketeering, kickbacks, and money
laundering, as well as wire, mail, bank, and tax fraud.” Id.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012); see infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.
4. 750 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2014).
5. See infra Parts II–IV.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
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I. THE CASE
The extensive investigative efforts of the Baltimore Police Department
(“BPD”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) resulted in the
prosecution of defendant Samuel L. Ocasio in Ocasio v. United States. 10
The BPD began its investigation in the summer of 2009, and the FBI joined
the investigation in 2010. 11 At the time the FBI became involved, the BPD
had identified fifty officers as possibly being involved in a conspiracy to
accept payoffs in exchange for referring persons in car wrecks to a local
vehicle repair business—Majestic Car Repair LLC (“MCR”).12 Majestic
Car Repair LLC was co-owned and operated by brothers Herman Alexis
Moreno and Edwin Javier Mejia. 13 During the winter of 2010, the FBI
placed a wiretap on Moreno’s telephone, and initiated surveillance of MCR
and Moreno’s private residence.14 From November 2010 to February 2011,
the FBI recorded thousands of phone calls between Moreno and various
BPD officers, including Ocasio. 15 The scheme between members of the
BPD and MCR consisted of BPD officers referring persons with wrecked
vehicles to MCR for repair in exchange for receiving payments from the
repair shop ranging from $150 to $350 per vehicle. 16 Knowledge of the
“kickback” 17 extortion scheme spread by word-of-mouth throughout the
BPD; consequently, the scheme metastasized.18
On March 9, 2011, Ocasio and ten co-defendants were indicted in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland on a single count
of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Section 371, 19 a violation of the Hobbs Act

10. Ocasio v. United States, 750 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2014).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kickbacks are defined as follows:
Probably the most common form of corruption after bribery is the “kickback.”
Traditionally, a kickback involved an employee receiving a salary, part of which he
returned or “kicked back” in cash to his employer . . . . Currently, however, kickbacks
most often involve purchase contracts rather than employment contracts, and a
kickback could now be defined as an extra charge which a vendor adds to the price of
an item sold to a government agency, that the vendor later gives or “kicks” back to the
government purchasing agent or other official in his personal capacity, either in cash or
in kind.
John R. Hailman, Corruption in Government Contracts: Bribery, Kickbacks, Bid-Rigging and the
Rest, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
CASES 15, 21 (1988), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/110010-110033NCJRS.pdf.
18. Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 403.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). Section 371 reads, in pertinent part:
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(“the Act”). 20 On October 19, 2011, the grand jury returned a seven-count
superseding indictment charging Ocasio.21 Count One of the superseding
indictment named Ocasio for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act for
engaging in the kickback-for-referral scheme. 22 A jury found Ocasio guilty
on all charges against him: conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion and
three other counts of Hobbs Act extortion.23 On June 1, 2012, the district
court judge sentenced Ocasio to eighteen months in prison, followed by
three years of supervised release.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the Count One
conviction was fatally flawed in light of Ocasio’s theory that conspiring to
extort property from one’s own co-conspirator does not contravene federal
law. 24 The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court, following
its precedent in United States v. Spitler, 25 in ruling that bribe-payers’ active
participation in schemes constitute co-conspirator extortion criminalized by
the Hobbs Act. 26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
scope of the Hobbs Act term “another,” relative to co-conspirators. 27 In
making its decision, the Court will apply fundamental principles of

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If,
however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Id.
20. Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 401. The Hobbs Act reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
....
(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)–(b) (2012).
21. Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 402.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 408. The second issue, not on appeal before the Supreme Court, was whether the
district court abused its discretion in compelling Ocasio to provide restitution for one of Ocasio’s
kickback offenses. Id. at 412.
25. 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986).
26. Ocasio, 750 F.3 at 411.
27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (Sept. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter Petition].
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statutory interpretation in consulting the text of the statute and its legislative
history, while also being mindful of the policy implications of its ruling. 28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Hobbs Act was originally passed to combat crimes of extortion
and robbery committed by labor unions. 29 In drafting the Act, Congress
looked to New York law for guidance in defining the crimes of extortion
and robbery. 30 Since the Act came into force, the scope of what constitutes
extortion has expanded in two significant ways. First, the Act’s definition
of extortion has been interpreted disjunctively in order to encompass public
officials soliciting illicit payments without the threat of violence, force, or
fear. 31 Second, judicial construction of the Hobbs Act has also extended so
far as to eliminate inducement as an element of extortion—a conspirator
now only need receive compensation to be liable for Hobbs Act extortion.32
There is currently a circuit split stemming from disagreement as to whether
the Hobbs Act term “another” contemplates criminal co-conspirators. 33 In
resolving this split, the Court will apply conventional methods of statutory
interpretation in first consulting the text of the Hobbs Act to derive its plain
meaning, and if that analysis does not resolve the case on its own, by
examining the Act’s legislative history as well.34
A. The Legislative History of the Hobbs Act
The framers of the Hobbs Act drafted the statute with the intention of
supplanting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Copeland AntiRacketeering Act of 1934. 35 The purpose of the Hobbs Act was to combat
union violence affecting interstate commerce in the form of extortion and
robberies. 36 The framers drafted the Act’s language to imitate the
definitions of those crimes in New York law, since labor union racketeering
was prevalent in New York. 37

28. See infra Part II.D.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. See infra Part II.D.
35. See infra Part II.B.1.
36. See infra Part II.B.1.
37. See 1942 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 16–19 (listing several instances of racketeering crimes
occurring in New York).
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1. The Hobbs Act Supplanted the Supreme Court’s Interpretation
of the Anti-Racketeering Act
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) originally prosecuted racketeering
crimes under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. 38 The Copeland AntiRacketeering Act of 1934 39 (“Anti-Racketeering Act”) was implemented to
more effectively suppress racketeering. 40 In United States v. Local 807 of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 41 the Supreme Court reviewed a
case involving charges levied against Teamsters for violating the AntiRacketeering Act. 42 Specifically, the Teamsters were charged with
conspiring to use and using violence and threats to obtain payments
equivalent to union dues from owners of “over-the-road’ 43 trucks entering
New York City. 44 The Court considered whether members of labor unions
could be charged with conspiracy under the Anti-Racketeering Act. 45 The

38. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7 (2012)); see also Investigation of So-Called “Rackets”: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 1 (1933) [hereinafter Investigation of So-Called “Rackets”]
(statement of Sen. Royal S. Copeland, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce) (“The cost of crime is
steadily advancing. Conservative students of the subject place the levy at varying amounts, even
as high as 13 billions of dollars annually.”).
39. Copeland Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, § 2, 48 Stat. 979–80 (1934) (originally
proposed as S. 2248, 73d Cong. (1934)).
40. See Investigation of So Called “Rackets,” supra note 38, at 17 (statement of James S.
Bolan, Comm’r of New York) (“The records show that the police have been unable to apprehend
in most cases those involved in rackets, because the trouble is in getting them speedily convicted,
and after they are convicted to be certain that they receive swift and sure punishment and that they
will remain in prison after they get there.”).
41. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
42. Copeland Anti-Racketeering Act, § 2. The Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any
degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to
move in trade or commerce—
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force,
violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the
purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the
payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force
or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or (b); or
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to commit any of the
foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or both.
Id.
43. The term encompasses trucks “of, for, or pertaining to transportation on public
highways.” Over-the-road, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/over-theroad?s=t (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
44. Local 807, 315 U.S. at 526.
45. Id. at 527–28.
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Court concluded that the Act did not encompass members of labor unions.46
Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision by attempting, but
failing, to pass legislation to amend the Anti-Racketeering Act in 1942 and
1943. 47 Congress finally succeeded, in passing the Hobbs Act in 1945, out
of a desire to supplant the Supreme Court’s ruling in Local 807 and to
combat the extortive activities of all persons, including members of labor
unions. 48
2. Hobbs Act Terms Imitate Analog Terms in New York Laws
The crimes of robbery and extortion, as defined in the Hobbs Act,
were specifically drafted to imitate the definitions for those crimes
articulated in New York Penal Code of 1909 (“Penal Code”). 49 The Penal
Code defined “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of
official right.” 50 The Penal Code defined “robbery” as:
the unlawful taking of personal property, from the person or in
the presence of another, against his will, by means of force, or
violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or
property, or the person or property of a relative or member of his
family, or of any one in his company at the time of the robbery. 51
The Penal Code was drafted to imitate the Field Code, a nineteenth-century
model code. 52

46. Id. at 535.
47. S. 2347, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R. 6872, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R. 7067, 77th Cong.
(1942); H.R. 653, 78th Cong. (1943).
48. H.R. 32, 79th Cong. (1945); see also 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep.
Hancock) (stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Local 807 was “a plain invitation to
Congress to enact an amendment such as the Hobbs bill, in which the word ‘whoever’ would
remove all question that Antiracketeering Act personalities are meant to apply to all persons,
including union officers or members, if they practice robbery or extortion”).
49. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock) (“The bill contains
definitions of robbery and extortion which follow the definitions contained in the laws of the State
of New York. It would change no State statutes, but the Supreme Court decision, if allowed to
stand, might affect State courts in construing those laws.”); see also id. at 11,906 (statement of
Rep. Robsion) (“The word ‘extortion’ as defined in this bill means the obtaining of property from
another with his consent but induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence or
fear. The definitions of robbery and extortion set out in this bill are the same definitions set out in
the New York State code of laws and are defined in substantially the same way by the laws of
every State in the Union.”); id. at 11,900 (statement of Rep. Hobbs) (“The definitions in this bill
are copied from the New York Code substantially.”).
50. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 850 (Consol. 1909).
51. Id. § 2120.
52. See 4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 613
(Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1998) (1865) (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”).
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After the Hobbs Act came into force, several federal courts of appeals
recognized that the Act borrowed its definitions of crimes from New York’s
laws. 53 Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted the link between the
definitions of robbery and extortion in New York’s laws and in the Act, in
Evans v. United States 54 and Scheidler v. National Organization for
Women, Inc. 55
B. The Expansion of Judicial Construction of Hobbs Act Extortion
Courts have gradually expanded their interpretations of the Hobbs
Act’s anti-extortion provision over time. 56 For the first few years following
the implementation of the Act, conduct amounting to force, violence, or fear
was required for an extortion conviction. 57 Federal courts of appeals
eliminated this requirement in the 1970s.58 In the early 1990s, inducement
was eliminated as an element of Hobbs Act extortion as well. 59 The Court
has only provided a few limiting interpretations on the Hobbs Act during
the same timeframe. 60
1. Prosecution of Hobbs Act Extortion in the Absence of Force,
Violence, or Fear
For thirty years following the Hobbs Act’s passage, the definition of
extortion in Section 1951(b)(2)—“actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right”61—was interpreted conjunctively:
public officials were not prosecuted when threats of force, violence, or fear
were absent. 62 In the 1960s, however, federal prosecutors began attempting
to use the Act to convict state officials for soliciting bribes.63 Courts were
initially reluctant to broaden the scope of Hobbs Act extortion to encompass
state officials who did not use threats of violence, force, or fear to solicit
illicit payments; the courts thought to do so would essentially render the
crimes of extortion and bribery indistinguishable. 64

53. See, e.g., United States v. Aguon, 851 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (same).
54. 504 U.S. 255, 264–65 (1992).
55. 537 U.S. 393, 403 (2003).
56. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
57. See infra Part II.B.1.
58. See infra Part II.B.1.
59. See infra Part II.B.1.
60. See infra Part II.B.2.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).
62. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 n.5 (1991).
63. See id. at 277–78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that courts were not pleased when
federal prosecutors began using the Hobbs Act to punish solicitation of bribes by state officials in
the 1960s).
64. Id.
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A significant shift in courts’ understanding of the Act occurred in 1972
when, in United States v. Kenny, 65 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit determined that Section 1951(b)(2) should be read
disjunctively: 66 Extortion consists of the “actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” 67 The Third Circuit came
to this conclusion because it believed that the Act merely “repeats the
common law definition of extortion, a crime which could only be
committed by a public official, and which did not require proof of threat,
fear, or duress.” 68
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit followed
in the Third Circuit’s footsteps, also favoring a disjunctive reading of
Section 1951(b)(2) in United States v. Braasch. 69 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that “the Act is to be construed broadly.” 70 Subsequently, several
federal courts of appeals adopted this line of reasoning, accepting an
expansive, disjunctive reading of the Hobbs Act’s definition of extortion. 71
The Supreme Court has also broadened the scope of Hobbs Act
extortion further by eliminating the inducement requirement. Until 1992,
federal courts of appeals were split as to whether inducement was an
element of Hobbs Act extortion. The majority view—the position of eight
circuits—was that inducement was not an element of Hobbs Act extortion
under the color of official right because no such element existed under the
common-law definition of extortion.72 Under this view, the crimes of
extortion and bribery overlap. 73 Alternatively, the minority view—that
inducement is an element of Hobbs Act extortion—was applied by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v.

65. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 1229.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
68. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.
69. 505 F.2d 139 (1974).
70. Id. at 152 n.8 (citing United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (1967)).
71. E.g., United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 304 (6th Cir. 1977) (adopting a disjunctive
reading of Section 1951(b)(2)); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 321 (10th Cir. 1976) (same);
United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1976) (same).
72. United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garner,
837 F.2d 1404, 1407, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1269, 1274–
75 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 580, 594–96 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc);
United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams,
621 F.2d 123, 123–24 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 413, 417–20 (6th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320–21 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 389–90, 393–95 (1st Cir. 1976).
73. See Jannotti, 637 F.2d at 595 (“The Government is merely required to prove that a public
official obtained money to which he was not entitled and which he obtained only because of his
official position.” (quoting United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980))).
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O’Grady, 74 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Aguon. 75
In Evans v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted the majority
view that inducement is not an element of extortion committed under the
color of official right. 76 The Evans Court first supported its conclusion by
noting its understanding that at common law, extortion, like bribery, did not
involve inducement. 77 The Court added that the Hobbs Act definition of
extortion is even broader than it was at common law because it
encompasses “conduct by a private individual as well as conduct by a
public official.” 78 Though the Court found the legislative history of the
Hobbs Act to be “sparse and unilluminating,” 79 it nevertheless concluded,
in view of the statutory language and legislative history of the Act, that
inducement cannot be an element of Section 1951(b)(2) extortion. 80
2. Limitations on Judicial Construction of the Hobbs Act
Despite the broad language of Section 1951(b)(2) of the Hobbs Act,
the Supreme Court has applied limitations to the construction of its
definition of extortion. One of these limitations is a restrictive reading of
the Hobbs Act definition of extortion in regards to campaign contributions
to elected officials.81 In McCormick v. United States, 82 the Court held that
proof of an explicit quid pro quo arrangement is necessary to uphold an
extortion conviction of a public official receiving campaign contributions
intended to influence that official. 83
Additionally, in Scheilder v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 84
the Supreme Court identified another limitation in holding that a defendant
must obtain or seek to obtain another’s property in order to be liable for
Hobbs Act extortion. 85 The case before the Court in Scheilder concerned
the prosecution of defendants who “shut down” abortion clinics.86 The
prosecution’s theory was that the defendants had committed Hobbs Act
extortion by threatening respondents in an effort to cause them to forfeit

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984).
851 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 263–64.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 268.
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 273
537 U.S. 393 (2003).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 398.
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their rights to medical services. 87 The Court reasoned that to construe the
definition of extortion so broadly as to contemplate the acts of the
defendants would render it, and the separate crime of coercion,
indistinguishable—a result inconsistent with the legislative history of the
Hobbs Act. 88 The Court concluded that because the petitioners did not
attempt to take the respondent’s property, the charges of conspiring to
commit extortion were fundamentally flawed.89
C. The Circuit Split Preceding Ocasio v. United States
A circuit split exists between the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit concerning how the word “another”
in Section 1951(b)(2) should be construed. In United States v. Brock,90 the
Sixth Circuit held that the Hobbs Act term “another” does not encompass
co-conspirators. 91 The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Spitler, however,
held that a defendant can be found guilty of extorting a co-conspirator under
the meaning of the term “another” in Section 1951(b)(2). 92
In Spitler, the defendant, Vice President of Transportation, Inspection,
Inc., complied with the Chief of the Metals Unit of the Maryland State
Highway Administration’s extortionate demands to purchase for him semiautomatic rifles, untraceable handguns, and jewelry—both before and after
being awarded a federally funded contract.93 The defendant contended on
appeal that he merely acquiesced to the Chief of Metal’s demands;
therefore, he argued that he was not culpable under Section 1951(b)(2). 94
The Fourth Circuit in Spitler disagreed, deciding that the defendant was no
mere extortion victim of the public official, but rather was properly
convicted as an actively engaged co-conspirator. 95 In so holding, the court
reasoned that relevant case law did not demand that it “paint with a broad
brush and declare a bright line,” the threshold at which a bribe-payer’s
conduct constitutes conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion.96 The court
simply determined that the defendant bribe-payer could not claim that he
was a “mere victim” in the case because the true victims of extortion
conspiracies are the government and taxpayers.97

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 400–01.
Id.
Id. at 410
501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 771.
United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1279 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1278–79.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
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In United States v. Brock, 98 the Sixth Circuit held that co-conspirators
cannot be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion. In Brock, the defendant
arranged with the supervisory clerk for the criminal division of the county
courthouse to remove scheduled forfeiture dealings in return for cash
payments. 99 The Sixth Circuit held in favor of the defendant, reasoning that
the Hobbs Act does not punish extortion in the form of private individuals
offering bribes to public officials.100 The court determined that the Hobbs
Act term “another” does not contemplate co-conspirators who obtain
property and consent from themselves in performing extortive acts. 101 The
court reasoned that the rule of lenity—a cannon of textual interpretation that
calls for the more lenient of competing interpretations of disputed statutory
language to be applied—should apply because it believed the Act’s text did
not unambiguously support the government’s purportedly harsher
interpretation. 102 The court also noted that the government’s theory of coconspirator extortion was contrary to federalism: “No one doubts that the
States have criminal laws prohibiting their citizens from bribing public
officials. Is there any reason to doubt the States’ willingness to invoke
these laws when their citizens engage in schemes as brazen as this one?”103
D. The Supreme Court Will Apply Statutory Interpretation Principles in
Ocasio v. United States
As articulated by Justice Thomas in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., when
the Court engages in statutory interpretation, it begins its analysis by
assessing the plain and ordinary meaning of disputed statutory language. 104
Justice Marshall articulated this principle in Gibbons v. Ogden, in relation
to Constitutional interpretation thusly: “the enlightened patriots who framed
our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have
said.” 105 The Court uses dictionaries to discover the plain and ordinary

98. 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007).
99. Id. at 765.
100. Id. at 768.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 769.
104. See 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,
505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); and then citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991))); see
also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127 (1998) (“We begin with the statute’s
language.”); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985) (disposing of the case in a manner
which observes the rule of thumb that statutory interpretation begins by analyzing the text of the
statute in dispute).
105. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
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meaning of such terms. 106 Relatedly, per the Court’s ruling in Chapman v.
United States, the rule of lenity does not factor into the Court’s analysis
until after the text is examined for its plain meaning, and that plain meaning
is determined to be unclear.107
A helpful precedent for the Supreme Court’s resolution of this circuit
split is its history of construing similarly broad language. In Ali v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 108 the Court construed the statutory term “any” very
broadly. 109 In Ali, the Court was given the task of interpreting Section
2680(c) of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 110 Under Section
2680(c), the FTCA waiver of the sovereign immunity concerning claims
arising out of torts committed by federal employees does not apply to “any
claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property
by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement
officer.” 111 The petitioner in Ali argued that a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
officer who allegedly lost his property during his detainment was liable
under the FTCA because the statutory term “any” only contemplated law
enforcement officers acting in an excise or customs capacity, not
exclusively acting as corrections officers. 112 The Court disagreed,
marshalling its decisions in Harrison v. PPG Industries 113 and United States
v. Gonzales 114 in holding that the word “any,” within the statutory scheme,
had an expansive meaning that contemplated the BOP officer as being
among those persons statutorily shielded from tort liability. 115
If the Court cannot dispose of a case based on its analysis of disputed
statutory text alone, it will examine the legislative history of the statute to
clarify its understanding. 116 The fact that the Hobbs Act’s language was
framed to imitate New York laws is very significant, because both the Field
106. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (“Consider first the word’s primary meaning.”).
The dictionaries cited by the Court should have existed contemporaneous to the time of the
statute’s enactment, in order to demonstrate the plain meaning of disputed terminology at the time
it was drafted. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed them.”).
107. 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (“The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at the end of the
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,
596 (1961))).
108. 552 U.S. 214 (2008).
109. Id. at 218.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).
112. Id. at 218–19.
113. 446 U.S. 578 (1980).
114. 520 U.S. 1 (1997).
115. Ali, 552 U.S. at 219–20, 227–28.
116. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 133 (1998) (examining legislative
history underlying the disputed statutory term subsequent to an analysis of the text of the statute).
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Code and the Penal Code punish extortion of co-conspirators. 117 The
consistent usage canon states that “identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” 118 The Court
specifically countenanced the reasonableness of the notion underlying the
consistent usage canon in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States: 119 “Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning.” 120 The Court’s precedent for applying the consistent usage
canon will be useful for its construction of the term “another” in light of its
New York antecedents because those antecedents contemplate coconspirator extortion. 121
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In United States v. Ocasio, the Fourth Circuit held that Ocasio’s
conspiracy conviction was correct, on the basis that the term “another” in
the Hobbs Act contemplates both one whom is both being extorted and one
whom is a co-conspirator. 122 The court stated that it would review de novo
questions of law, including any issues of statutory interpretation.123
Ocasio argued that the Fourth Circuit should apply the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Brock to reverse his conviction, on the
basis that conspiracy to extort a co-conspirator operating in the same
criminal scheme is not contemplated by Section 1951(b)(2). 124 The
government’s position, conversely, rested on the notion that nothing in the
text of the Hobbs Act precludes the term “another” from contemplating
criminal co-conspirators. The court dismissed Ocasio’s arguments that the
“from another” language forecloses his culpability for extorting coconspirators (Moreno and Mejia). 125 The court noted that nothing in the
Hobbs Act compels a restrictive interpretation of the disputed language that
would negate Ocasio’s conviction. 126 The court also rejected Ocasio’s
attempt to reduce the Spitler rule to absurdity; the Court asserted that the
“active participation” standard does not render every victim’s consent to a

117. See infra Part IV.B.
118. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v.
ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994)).
119. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
120. Id. at 433 (citing Courtauld v. Legh, [1869] 4 LR Exch. 126, 130‒31 (Eng.) (articulating
the consistent usage canon)).
121. See infra Part IV.B.2.
122. 750 F.3d 399 (2014).
123. Id. at 408 (citing United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006)).
124. Id. at 408–09.
125. Id. at 411 (citing United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 767 (6th Cir. 2007)).
126. Id.
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Hobbs Act conspiracy scheme, “a separately punishable conspiracy in every
[Section] 1951(a) case.” 127
In assessing the relevance and reasoning of the Brock and Spitler
decisions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Spitler was the controlling
precedent because Spitler was decided by a Fourth Circuit panel.128 As a
result, the Fourth Circuit applied the Spitler “active participation” standard,
concluding that “a person like Moreno or Mejia, who actively participates
(rather than merely acquiesces) in a conspiratorial extortion scheme, can be
named and prosecuted as a co-conspirator even though he is also a
purported victim of the conspiratorial agreement.”129 The court treated the
text as being perfectly clear on the scope of liability: nothing in the text
raised any possibility in the court’s mind that the term “another” could be
limited to exclude co-conspirators. 130
The Fourth Circuit observed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Robinson
in determining that the meaning of the text was clear enough to dispose in
the government’s favor and uphold Ocasio’s conviction. 131 The court also
followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chapman in declining to afford
Ocasio relief under the rule of lenity because of the lack of ambiguity in the
text of the statute. 132 The issue, currently on appeal before the Supreme
Court, is whether under Section 1951(b)(2) extortion can only be
perpetrated by third parties outside of a conspiracy, or whether it can also
involve co-conspirators. 133
IV. ANALYSIS
A conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion as defined in Section
1951(b)(2) requires that conspirators agree to obtain property from another
party, but that party need not be a third party (that is, someone outside of
the conspiracy). 134 The ordinary meaning of the language of the statute
compels this conclusion because the word “another” plainly means
anyone. 135 The legislative history of the Hobbs Act supports this
conclusion as well. Both the statements of congressmen supporting the
passage of the Act, and the language of New York codes upon which the
Act is based, indicate that the word “another” should be broadly

127. Id. (quoting Opening Brief for Appellant at 28, Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399 (No. 1:11-cr00122-CCB-13)).
128. Id. at 411–12.
129. Id. at 410.
130. Id. at 411 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
131. Id. at 411–12 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).
132. Id. at 412.
133. Petition, supra note 27, at i.
134. See infra Part IV.A–C.
135. See infra Part IV.A.
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construed. 136 Finally, public policy considerations support a broad
construction of Section 1951(b)(2) as contemplating co-conspirator
extortion, for it would neither burden judicial economy nor encroach on
federalism. 137 Instead, it would facilitate prosecution of corrupt public
officials, especially corrupt police officers.138
A. The Text of the Hobbs Act Contemplates Co-conspirator Extortion
The text of Section 1951(b)(2) does not support Ocasio’s assertion that
Hobbs Act extortion can only involve third parties outside of a criminal
conspiracy. The Court’s first step in interpreting Section 1951(b)(2) will be
to assess the text of the statute.139 If the disputed language is unambiguous,
the Court’s inquiry will cease. 140 The government, in its response to
Ocasio’s petition for certiorari, argued that, “[t]he statute does not state that
the defendant must agree to obtain property from someone outside of the
conspiracy.” 141 In making this argument, the government essentially
invoked the negative implication canon of statutory construction: expressio
unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing implies the
exclusion of others. 142 This proposition is not persuasive because Ocasio
could just as easily have invoked the same canon in arguing that, “[t]he
statute does not state that the defendant must agree to obtain property from
someone inside of the conspiracy.” 143
The Court’s statutory inquiry, to reiterate, should observe the plain
meaning rule by beginning with the text. 144 Here, the ordinary meaning of
the term “another” demonstrates that Section 1951(b)(2) is sufficiently
broad to contemplate extortion of co-conspirators. Any resource indicating
136. See infra Part IV.B.
137. See infra Part IV.C.
138. See infra Part IV.C.
139. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
140. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
141. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 7, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (Dec.
29, 2014).
142. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 107 (2012) (“The doctrine properly applies only when the unius (or technically,
unum, the thing specified) can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the
grant or prohibition involved.”).
143. See id. at 108 (“Even when an all-inclusive sense seems apparent, one must still identify
the scope of the inclusiveness (thereby limiting implied exclusion).”).
144. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–32 (1998) (assessing the meaning of
the phrase “carries a firearm” in light of its primary dictionary definition, its etymology, its use in
literature, its colloquial usage in society, and its use in case law); compare WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2 (4th ed. 2003) (“This plain meaning rule, it has been noted, ‘reaffirms the
preeminence of the statute over materials extrinsic to it.’” (quoting R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229 (1975))), with SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 142, at 69 (“The ordinary meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of
interpretation.”).
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the primary meaning of a disputed term should be roughly concurrent to the
time in which the statutory term was drafted in order to fairly communicate
its plain and ordinary meaning. 145 The government asserts in Section
1951(b)(2) that, “‘[w]hoever’ refers to the defendant official and ‘property
from another’ refers to property not belonging to that official.”146
Contemporaneous lexicographical authorities support this conclusion. For
example, the word “another” in the 1934 edition of Merriam Webster’s
Second International Dictionary is defined as “indefinitely any one or
anything else.” 147 The 1933 edition of Black’s Legal Dictionary merely
defined the word “another” as being equivalent to the word “additional.”148
Moreover, neither of the these dictionaries defined extortion in such a
manner as to lead one to believe that Hobbs Act extortion only applies to
third parties. 149
Supreme Court precedent governing statutory interpretation of the
word “any,” a similarly broad modifier to “another,” also supports the
application of the ordinary-meaning rule, vindicating the government’s
construction of the Hobbs Act. Especially relevant to the Court’s analysis
in Ocasio is its precedented technique in Ali of deriving the plain meaning
of the word “any” from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, in
determining that, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or

145. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed them.”).
146. Brief for the United States at 21, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (July 30, 2015)
(citing Another, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 48 (10th ed. 1993)). The
government should not have used the tenth edition of Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary in
its brief to define the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “another.” The dictionary cited by
the government, published in 1993, was not written in a timeframe contemporaneous to the
passing of the Hobbs Act, and, therefore, does not demonstrate the plain and ordinary meaning of
the word “another” in 1946. The word “another,” as defined by a dictionary contemporaneous to
the passing of the Hobbs Act, is:
1. One more, by way of addition; an additional one, similar in likeness or effect; as, eat
another piece. 2. Not the same; different;—often used with to, from, or now usually,
than; as try another way than that. 3. Any or some other; any one else; some one else;
as, “Let another man praise thee.”
Another, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1933) (emphasis added).
147. Another, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(William A. Neilson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1934). This dictionary defines the pronoun “another” as:
1. One more; a second or additional one.
2. Any or some other; any different person: indefinitely any one or thing else; some one
or thing else; as of the three routes one is dangerous, another crowded;—used also with
one in a reciprocal sense (asked the boys one of another, that is, of each other).
Id. (emphasis added).
148. Another, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
149. Compare Extortion, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, supra note 147, with Extortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 148.
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some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” 150 For the purposes of this case,
it seems reasonable for the word “another” to be construed in the same
fashion that the Court has construed the modifier “any,” when
contemplating whether the Hobbs Act encompasses co-conspirator
extortion. 151 Like the plain meaning of the word “any” in Ali, the ordinary
meaning of the word “another” here is expansive, and therefore
contemplates co-conspirators. 152 The Court here has “no reason to demand
that Congress write less economically and more repetitiously,” 153 and,
therefore, should be “unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create
ambiguity where the statute’s text and structure suggest none.”154 In view
of this analysis, Ocasio’s assertion at oral argument that the modifier “any”
contemplates co-conspirators, but “another” does not, is fundamentally
false. 155 In sum, after considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the
word “another” in Section 1951(b)(2), the Court’s statutory inquiry should
cease. 156
Two arguments against the government’s construction of the text of
Section 1951(b)(2) obfuscate the appropriate textual basis for Ocasio’s
conviction. First, Ocasio’s supporters argue that the rule of lenity ought to
compel the Court to choose the narrower construction of the term
“another.” 157 The rule of lenity is “when there are two rational readings of
a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher

150. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
97 (1976))).
151. The words are intuitively similar in breadth on their face, and the conceptual equivalence
of these two words is reinforced by the fact that the Field Code of 1865, upon which the Hobbs
Act is based, critically used the word “any” in identifying the scope of its extortion statute. See
infra Part IV.B.2.
152. Compare supra notes 146–148 (comparing various dictionaries’ definition of the
meaning of the word “another”), with Ali, 552 U.S. at 219 (invoking precedent utilizing
dictionaries to construe the ordinary meaning of a disputed statutory term).
153. Ali, 552 U.S. at 221 (“Congress could not have chosen a more all-encompassing phrase
than ‘any other law enforcement officer’ to express its intent.”).
154. Id. at 227 (indicating that the word “any” has an expansive meaning).
155. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (Oct. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Transcript] (“Mr. Davis: ‘Justice Alito, I think yes, it is. And two distinctions from
the Mann Act cases: The first is that the Mann Act used the phrase “any woman,” not “another
woman.” I think that case would have been different if it had used the phrase ‘another woman.’
Justice Alito: ‘Well, “any woman” is broader than “another woman.” “Any woman” means any of
the 3.5 billion-plus women in the world, and that subsumes “another woman,” doesn’t it?’”).
156. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
157. See, e.g., Brief for Former United States Attorneys as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 8, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (June 8, 2015) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief]
(referencing Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 408–09 (2003), in
noting that, “[a]fter all, this Court has expressly extended the ‘rule of lenity’ to the Hobbs Act”).
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only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.” 158 Ocasio
confuses the breadth of the term “another” with ambiguity. 159 The fact that
the term “another” in Section 1951(b)(2) unambiguously applies to
“persons” in general, and not merely third parties outside of a criminal
conspiracy, as Ocasio suggests, forecloses any application of the rule of
lenity in this instance.160
Second, Ocasio argues that the government’s construction of the term
“another” in Section 1951(b)(2) as contemplating extortion of a coconspirator is impermissible because such construction blurs the distinction
between bribery and extortion.161 Ocasio’s argument is predicated on the
false notion that bribery and extortion must be mutually exclusive crimes,
when in fact, historically speaking, the crimes of bribery and extortion have
always been understood to overlap. 162
The concept that bribery and extortion crimes are not mutually
exclusive is manifest in case law. For example, the court held in United
States v. Kenny that the crimes of extortion and bribery can overlap, since a
person choosing to pay to influence a public official can be influenced by
the office of said official. 163 The commonsense notion that bribery and
extortion overlap is illustrated in the scenario where a criminal pays a police
officer hush money in order to avoid arrest: said police officer commits
extortion when electing not to arrest a criminal in return for payment, but

158. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987) (citing United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971); then citing United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218, 221–22 (1952)).
159. See Transcript, supra note 155 (recounting Justice Alito’s statement: “Well, ‘any’ woman
is broader than ‘another woman.’ Any woman means any of the 3.5 billion-plus women in the
world, and that subsumes ‘another woman,’ doesn’t it?”).
160. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“The rule [of lenity] comes into
operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”); WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 147, at 902.
161. See Petition, supra note 27, at 15 (“A related problem is that the government’s theory
also transforms every act of receiving a bribe into a conspiracy.”); see also Brief for Petitioner at
25, 43–44, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]
(stating that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation transforms every payment of a bribe a conspiracy
to commit extortion); Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 157, at 9 (same).
162. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 821 (1988) (“Further, most statutes
prohibiting official extortion from the First Statute of Westminster (1275), through the 19thcentury Field Code punished the mere receipt of a corrupt payment as extortion.” (footnotes
omitted)).
163. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); see also James P.
Fleissner, Prosecuting Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: Inducement as an Element of
Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066, 1072 (1985) (“The [Kenny]
holding thus implied that the crimes of extortion and bribery could overlap, since even a person
‘voluntarily’ paying an official could be influenced by the coercive force of the office.”).
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the criminal commits bribery in paying money to avoid arrest.164 Indeed, in
Evans, the Supreme Court determined that an assertion that a defendant
committed bribery is not an appropriate defense to a Hobbs Act extortion
allegation, a ruling that disposes of Ocasio’s argument. 165
B. The Legislative History of the Hobbs Act Supports the
Government’s Construction
Even if the text of the Hobbs Act is not sufficiently clear for the
disposition of the case, the legislative history of the Hobbs Act reinforces
the textual basis for Ocasio’s conviction. The internal legislative history of
the Hobbs Act—including the congressional debate over the statute and its
antecedents—and the coverage of the Hobbs Act in the media, support this
conclusion. 166 Furthermore, the external legislative history of the Hobbs
Act, that is, the New York laws upon which the statute is based, also
support the government’s construction of Section 1951(b)(2).167
1.

Internal Legislative History Supports the Government’s
Construction of the Hobbs Act 168

The initial purpose of the Hobbs Act was to prevent the interference of
labor unions with interstate commerce. 169 The House Debates on the Hobbs
Act illustrate the intent of Congress. 170 Those debates reveal that the statute
was designed to criminalize behavior that the Supreme Court had ruled was
not contemplated under the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act. 171 Indeed, in

164. Behavior constituting bribery is punished by federal extortion statutes such as the Travel
Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), despite the fact that
those statutes afford different penalties for said behavior. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1962 (2012).
165. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 267 n.18 (determining that extortion under
color of official right and bribery are not mutually exclusive).
166. See infra Part IV.B.1.
167. See infra Part IV.B.2.
168. “Internal legislative history” refers to legislative materials related to the Hobbs Act.
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. See ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR. & THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE
RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB 255 n.47 (1983) (“The
debates in the House on H.R. 653 were fairly extensive and are as much a legitimate source of
legislative history from which probable legislative intent may be deduced as are the debates on the
identical bill in the following session.” (citing United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404–05
n.14 (1973))).
171. See id. at 257 (“Perhaps the clearest indication of what Congress intended by its
repudiation of Local 807 can be found in the fact that the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Stone
was repeatedly referred to in approving terms.”). Though, as introduced in the Senate, the AntiRacketeering Act did not mention activities of labor unions, it seems evident that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of that statute struck against its underlying legislative intent, namely being
to punish labor union crime. See id. at 245 (“The original federal anti-extortion statute, known as
the Anti-Racketeering Act, was one of several bills that came out of the extensive investigations
of ‘racketeering’ conducted in 1933 by the Copeland Committee, a special subcommittee of the
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response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Local 807, the Hobbs Act
legislation went through the upper chambers of Congress like a “jetpropelled missile.” 172 The public was overwhelmingly in favor of the
legislation. 173 Congressional support for the legislation was equally
overwhelming. 174 The Act entered into force despite President Truman
initially vetoing it.175
Statements of Representatives Hancock, Celler, Springer, and
Whittington, all supporters of the Hobbs Act, demonstrate that the Act’s
most vocal supporters intended it to be broadly construed. 176 Though the
Act’s initial purpose was to fight labor racketeering, the intent of Congress
was to codify the common law crime of extortion. 177 Critically, the Hobbs
Act was not drafted merely to criminalize the activities of Teamsters that
interfered with interstate commerce: the word “whoever” in Section
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce. As introduced in the Senate, this bill did not
specifically include or exclude the activities of labor unions.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert C.
Albright, Part of Case Bill Back at White House: Senate Passes Hobbs “Racke” Measure, Vetoed
as Rider, Without Debate, WASH. POST, June 22, 1946, at A1.
172. William Knighton, Jr., Senate Passes Hobbs Measure Unanimously, Action Is
Unexpected, BALT. SUN, June 22, 1946, at A1.
173. See At Long Last, the Hobbs Bill Becomes the Law of the Land, BALT. SUN, July 5, 1946,
at A14 (“There was no doubt that the general sentiment of the public was in its favor.”).
174. See C. P. Ives, A Clinical Chronology of the Hobbs Bill, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1946, at A10
(“Now try a little arithmetic. If all the Hobbs-bill votes on the four occasions when in one form or
another the bill was before the House are totaled, the result is 1,019 votes in favor to 446 votes in
opposition. The Senate voted on the Hobbs bill in one form or another three times, with a total of
142 votes in favor to 84 against. Adding the House and Senate tallies, we get 1,161 votes in favor
of the Hobbs bill in one form or another to 530 votes against.”).
175. THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at n.48. As Thieblot and Haggard noted:
After passing the House in independent form, 91 CONG. REC. 11,922 (1945), the
substance of the Hobbs Act was also incorporated into the Case Bill, H.R. 4908, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), which passed Congress but which was vetoed by President
Truman, 92 CONG. REC. 674 (1946). Immediately after the veto, the Senate took up
and passed the Hobbs Act as previously approved in independent form by the House,
92 CONG. REC. 7308 (1946), thus making tit law in spite of the veto.
Id. (citing John A. Carver, Jr., Comment, Labor Law—A New Federal Antiracketeering Law, 35
GEO. L.J. 362 (1947); then citing Logan D. Howell, Comment, The Hobbs Act—An Amendment to
the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 25 N.C. L. REV. 58 (1946)).
176. See infra notes 178–181.
177. As one United States Attorney explains:
No debate centered on official corruption, since the concern of the Congress at the time
of passage was labor racketeering. Nevertheless, Congress adopted language contained
in the New York Code in defining extortion. Included within that definition was the
obtaining of property “under color of official right.” The Hobbs Act as enacted thus
codified the English common law crime of extortion, an offense that could be
committed only by public officials, and that consisted of the taking of property by such
an official which was not due him or his office. Unlike the other activity prohibited by
the Hobbs Act, which generally fell within the common law prohibitions against
blackmail or assault, extortion by public officials was a misdemeanor at common law.
Lee J. Radek, Hobbs Act, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 17, app. F
at 413, 415.
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1951(b)(2), according to Representative Hancock, was intended to “remove
all question that Antiracketeering Act penalties are meant to apply to all
persons, including union officers or members, if they practice robbery or
extortion.” 178 Representative Celler indicated that the Hobbs Act was
intended to apply to any citizen committing acts of extortion or robbery. 179
Indeed, Representative Springer’s rejoinder to the vociferous criticism of
the Act by pro-labor congressmen was that the proposed legislation was so
sweeping that it did not target labor in particular.180 In sum, Ocasio’s claim
that the Hobbs Act does not punish extortion of a co-conspirator cannot be
sustained—the statute was intended to punish extortion and robbery, in
Representative Whittington’s words, “no matter by whom committed.”181
2.

External Legislative History Supports the Government’s
Construction 182

The Hobbs Act was drafted to imitate the New York Penal Code of
1909 (“Penal Code”), and the Penal Code’s predecessor, the Field Code of
1865. 183 Ocasio admits that the Hobbs Act was framed to imitate these
New York laws, 184 but is wrong to nevertheless assert that there is no
evidence suggesting that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to grant federal
prosecutors’ the authority approved by the Fourth Circuit decision in
Spitler. 185 An analysis of both New York codes supports the government’s
construction of Section 1951(b)(2) as embracing extortion of a coconspirator. 186
Analysis of the Penal Code supports the notion that a conspirator can
extort their co-conspirator under the Hobbs Act. Section 850 of Penal Code
Article 80 (titled “Extortion and Threats”) defines extortion generally as
178. 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock) (emphasis added). It is not
inappropriate in this instance to use news coverage to illustrate the purpose of the Hobbs Act.
Representative Hancock himself cited news coverage of the Hobbs Act legislation in articulating
the purpose of Congress, through the Hobbs Act, to supplant the decision of the Supreme Court in
Local 807. Id.
179. See id. at 11,909 (statement of Rep. Celler) (“This act is intended to apply only to a
citizen who is guilty of robbery or extortion.”).
180. See id. at 11,911 (statement of Rep. Springer) (“I state that there is nothing in this
legislation which relates to labor. Labor is not mentioned in the bill. It applies to every American
citizen.”).
181. See id. at 11,913 (statement of Rep. Whittington) (“It punishes extortion and robbery no
matter by whom committed.”).
182. “External” refers to the New York laws the Hobbs Act was framed to imitate.
183. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (providing the New York Penal Code and
Field Code that guided the framing of the Hobbs Act).
184. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 161, at 40–41 (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2721, 2724 (2013)).
185. Id. at 40–41, 42.
186. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 850–59, 2120–28 (Consol. 1909) (defining offenses), with
4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, supra note 52, at §§ 613–19 (same).
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“the obtaining property from another, with his consent, induced by a
wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.” 187 The
definition of “extortion committed under color of official right” in Section
854, 188 and the definition of “a person acting under threats” in Section
859 189—both stated under Article 80—also use the critical term “another.”
Per the Court’s paradigm for statutory interpretation set out in
Robinson, it can look to the usage of the term “another” in the greater
statutory context of Article 80 to understand its meaning. 190 In applying
this canon, Section 859 of the Penal Code is instructive towards unpacking
the meaning of the word “another” as it applies to extortion. Critically,
Section 859 employs the word “another” to refer to a person within a
criminal conspiracy. 191 The clause, “by threats of another person engaged
in that act or omission,” specifically links the word “another” to the
conspiracy of “two or more persons” involved in the commission of a
crime. 192 Therefore, the presumption of consistent usage of the term
“another” in Article 80 of the Penal Code compels the conclusion that the
term “another” contemplates extortion as being a crime that can be
committed by any person—including a co-conspirator—engaged in an act
or omission constituting extortion. 193 Absent any evidence to the contrary,
it logically follows that the drafters of the Hobbs Act adopted this
construction of the word “another” in modeling the language of Hobbs Act
on the Penal Code of 1909. 194
187. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 850.
188. Id. § 854. Section 854 of the Penal Code provides:
A public officer, or a person pretending to be such, who, unlawfully and maliciously,
under pretense or color of official authority:
1. Arrests another, or detains him against his will; or,
2. Seizes or levies upon another’s property; or,
3. Dispossesses another of any lands or tenements; or,
4. Does any other act, whereby another person is injured in his person, property, or
rights,
5. Commits oppression and is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
189. Id. § 859. Section 859 of the Penal Code provides:
Where a crime is committed or participated in by two or more persons, and is
committed, aided, or participated in by any one of them, only because, during the time
of its commission, he is compelled to do, or to aid or participate in the act, by threats of
another person engaged in that act or omission, and reasonable apprehension on his part
of instant death or grievous bodily harm, in case he refuses, the threats and
apprehension constitute duress, and excuse him.
Id.
190. See supra note 104.
191. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 859.
192. Id.
193. See id. (using the term “another” in a manner inclusive of behavior, either action or
omission, that equates to extortion).
194. See id. (defining the term “another” as inclusive of intra-conspiratorial extortion).
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A similar analysis of the model Field Code of 1865 leads to the same
result. 195 The word “another,” as used in the Field Code, was meant to
apply broadly to “every person” who engaged in extortionate behavior, not
merely extortionate behavior directed towards third parties. 196 The broad
scope of the Field Code bolsters the consistent usage canon analysis of the
Penal Code, which supports the government’s construction of Section
1951(b)(2) in this case. 197
C. Public Policy Benefits from the Government’s Construction of the
Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act may be the most important instrument for prosecuting
extortion in federal law. 198 Other laws punishing extortion do not possess
the slight burden of proof the Hobbs Act requires relative to the strength of
the punishment it imposes. 199 For example, the Travel Act punishes
distribution of illicitly obtained proceeds of illegal activities affecting
195. Compare id. (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”), with 4 COMM’RS OF
THE CODE, supra note 52, § 613 (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”). The
commission that developed the Field Code was appointed in 1847. John L. McClellan,
Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code, 4 DUKE
L.J. 663, 671 (1971). In 1850, the commission submitted complete codes of criminal and civil
procedure to the New York legislature, though only the latter was adopted. Id. In 1857 the New
York legislature requested that another commission to develop penal, civil, criminal codes, and
codes of criminal and civil procedure. Id. The new commission was headed by several experts at
bar, including chairman David Dudley Field, Alexander W. Bradford, and William Curtis Noyes.
GERHARD O. W. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW, AND THE SCHOLARS: A HISTORY OF SCHOLARSHIP IN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1969). Upon the commission’s submission of its work to the
legislature in 1865, only the code of criminal procedure was adopted by New York. Id.
196. See 4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, supra note 52, at §§ 615–19 (stating, in the following
provisions: Section 615: “Every person who extorts any money or other property from another,
under circumstances not amounting to robbery, by means of force or any threat such as is
mentioned in the last section, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding five
years.” Section 617: “Every person, who, by any extortionate means, obtains from another his
signature to any paper or instrument, whereby, if such signature were freely given, any property
would be transferred, or any debt, demand, charge or right of action created, is punishable in the
same manner as if the actual delivery of such property or payment of the amount of such debt,
demand, charge or right of action, were obtained.” Section 618: “Every person who, with intent to
extort any money or other property from another, sends to any person any letter or another
writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat, such
as specified in section 614, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were
actually obtained by means of such threat.” Section 619: “Every person who unsuccessfully
attempts by means of any verbal threat, such as is specified in Section 614, to extort money or
other property from another, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (emphasis added)).
197. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 850–59, 2120–28, and 4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, supra
note 52, §§ 613–19 (broadly criminalizing extortionate behavior of “every person”) with 18
U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (criminalizing extortion of “another”).
198. See S. REP. NO. 96-553, at 643 (1980) (“Perhaps the single most important extortion
provision in current Federal law is the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951.”).
199. 18 U.S.C. §§ 665(a), 872, 874, 875(a), 875(b), 876(b), 877, 878(b), 1952 (2012).
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interstate commerce with merely a fine and/or five years or less of jail
time. 200 Public policy, therefore, supports a construction of the Act that
encompasses co-conspirator extortion because it is an effective anticorruption measure, especially in regards to police corruption.201
1.

An Expansive Interpretation of the Hobbs Acts Combats
Corruption

An expansive interpretation of the Hobbs Act as contemplating coconspirator extortion within the “under color of public right” clause of
Section 1951(b)(2) benefits public policy by helping to combat corruption.
The historic tendency of the judiciary to broadly construe the Hobbs Act,
emanating from the Supreme Court’s decision in Kenny is justified, given
that public corruption is a national problem. 202 The remarks of the
Honorable Arnold I. Burns, Deputy Attorney General of the United States
at the New York Winter Conference in 1988 serve to illustrate that
reality. 203 Burns noted that while levels of public corruption are difficult to
quantify due to the discrete and illicit nature of criminal activity, seventyfive percent of FBI field offices at one point during his tenure reported that
they were challenged by an epidemic of public corruption.204 The
Department of Justice, as Burns stated, responded to this problem by
making prosecution for political corruption a top departmental priority. 205
Consequently, the DOJ’s efforts have met great success—between 1977
and 1986 alone, federal corruption convictions increased fourfold, in large
part thanks to the enforcement of the Hobbs Act.206
Though the federal government has a variety of statutory weapons to
fight corruption, 207 the Hobbs Act is an especially favorable tool given the
slight burden of proof it requires (de minimis interference with interstate

200. 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
201. See infra note 220 (indicating that criminal convictions of corrupt public officials can be
an impetus to reform).
202. See supra note 1.
203. See generally Arnold I. Burns, Hon. Deputy Att’y General of the United States, Address
at the 1988 Winter Conference of New York State District Attorneys Association at the Omni
Park
Central
Hotel
(Jan.
21,
1988),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/109132NCJRS.pdf (remarking that public corruption
is a national problem meriting a federal response).
204. Id. at 2 (“However, we do know that in a Department of Justice survey just a few years
ago, 75 percent of the FBI’s field offices reported state and local public corruption as one of their
most serious problems. And we also know that prosecutions at both the federal level and the state
and local level are definitely up as our law enforcement agencies are working harder and more
effectively to curb this plague of public corruption.”).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 4.
207. Examples include the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012), and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
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commerce) 208 and the severity of the penalty (a twenty-year maximum
sentence) 209 contained within it. 210 Litigation concerning this “under color
of official right” clause has expanded in large measure because of its
superiority as a tool for attacking state and local corruption.211 Successful
corruption prosecutions under the “color of official right” clause of Section
1951(b)(2) have not varied substantially by jurisdiction. 212 A construction
of Section 1951(b)(2) as encompassing co-conspirator extortion advances
the ability of the DOJ to effectively apply its most potent statutory weapon
for fighting corruption. 213
The Hobbs Act, as illustrated in the prosecution of Samuel Ocasio, is
an especially helpful tool for prosecuting police corruption. Investigation
and prosecution of police corruption by state authorities is problematic
because it involves a classic conundrum: Quis custodiet ipsos custodies—
“who watches the watchmen?” 214 The difficulties associated with state
investigation and prosecution of police corruption were summed up by
Herbert Beigel as follows: “(1) One cannot effectively investigate himself;
(2) Local government officials are themselves paying the police for favors;
and (3) The citizenry largely acquiesces in and enjoys the favors and
leniency granted by the police who can be bought.” 215 Corruption has

208. See United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 901–03 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
209. 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) (2012).
210. See Radek, supra note 177, app. F at 413, 414 (“Despite the fact that the Travel Act (18
U.S.C. § 1952), RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962), and 18 U.S.C. § 666 provide for more direct Federal
jurisdiction over bribery of state and local officials, the most popular statutory tool used by
Federal law enforcement for combating state and local corruption continues to be the prohibition
against extortion contained in the Hobbs Act. The reasons for this popularity are basic: ease of
proof and severity of penalty. These advantages, however, also could foster judicial animosity.
For this reason it is important for Department personnel to exercise extreme care in the use of this
powerful tool so that its continuing availability is insured.”).
211. See White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law—Extortion, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 257,
262 (1980) (“Litigation concerning this segment of the definition of extortion is the most rapidly
growing area under the Hobbs Act, because it is an expedient vehicle for federal prosecution of
local political corruption. . . . Nonetheless, a recent GAO Report, analyzing convictions of
federal, state, and local officials in eight judicial districts in 1977–78, indicates that the Hobbs Act
is a far more effective tool in attacking state and local corruption than is the Travel Act.”).
212. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL § 2404 (1997), http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual2404-hobbs-act-under-color-official-right (“This theory of extortion under color of official right
has resulted in the successful prosecution of a wide range of officials, including those serving on
the federal, state and local levels.”).
213. See id. (explaining the efficacy of Hobbs Act prosecutions).
214. Herbert Beigel, Criminal Law: The Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption,
65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 n.2 (1974) explaining the difficulties of attacking police
corruption); David Isenberg, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodies? HUFFPOST BUS. BLOG (May 31,
2010,
12:25
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/quis-custodiet-ipsoscust_b_595304.html.
215. Beigel, supra note 214.
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afflicted municipal law enforcement from its very inception. 216 A variety of
reports—such as that of the Knapp and Mollen Commissions in New York,
appointed in April of 1970 and July of 1992 respectively—as well as the
Chicago Commission appointed in February of 1997, have indicated that
municipal police corruption is an important national issue. 217 The Knapp
Commission identified two classes of police corruption: (1) grass-eaters—
corrupt police who passively accept gratuities but do not pursue corrupt
payments, and (2) meat-eaters—corrupt police who aggressively pursue
scenarios they can exploit for financial gain. 218 Importantly, the Mollen
Commission found that in New York City, police corruption has gradually
worsened over time, with meat-eating displacing grass-eating as the
dominant form of police corruption. 219
Herbert Beigel argues that true police reform can only be
accomplished internally. 220 The crux of this argument is the Weberian
notion that “culture is destiny,” 221 and, therefore, that the ultimate check
against corruption is the zeitgeist of an organization.222 While this point has
merit, the government must necessarily do what it can to cast corruption
into the public eye, which may serve as an impetus for political action. 223
As Assistant Attorney General William F. Weld stated:
Witnesses who do not see bribery or extortion as serious crimes
do not want to come forward, do not see the need to testify, and
216. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-111, LAW ENFORCEMENT:
INFORMATION ON DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION 6 (1998). The first municipal police
department in the United States, the New York Police Department, was plagued by corruption in
1844, the year of its inception. Id.
217. Id. at 1–6.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Beigel, supra note 214, at 135–36. Beigel concludes:
No matter how many individual officers are actually indicted and convicted in any
investigation, there will be no appreciable effect on the day-to-day operations and
internal disciplinary mechanism of the police department unless efforts are made by
those directly in charge of the department to institute major reforms. Consequently, it
is difficult to justify a federal investigation of police corruption on the basis that such
an investigation will have any long run effect on the quality or integrity of local law
enforcement over which the federal government exercises little control.
Id. at 155.
221. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM
(1905), reprinted in THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds. & trans., Penguin Books 2002) (generally
advancing the theory that cultural forces drive history and precipitate economic and political
change); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835), reprinted in
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICA AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 23, 58 (Gerald E. Bevan trans.,
Penguin Books 2003) (same).
222. See Burns, supra note 203, at 9 (arguing that the real check against public corruption is
public outcry).
223. See Beigel, supra note 214, at 156 (explaining that conviction of corrupt public officials
can spur reform).
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will not cooperate in investigations. Prosecutors who are
reluctant to challenge the power structure, and judges who let
corrupt officials stay on the street, have unwittingly aided and
abetted this problem.
....
. . . The most effective thing the Justice Department can do is to
bring more corruption cases, cases designed to attack the corrupt
power structure wherever it exists and cases which challenge the
assumption of any of those on top who may believe they are
above the law. It is important that we bring cases that are
designed to change public attitudes, cases that make it apparent
who has profited at the public’s expense.224
Federal investigation and prosecution under the Hobbs Act are
essential, as they can deliver the political pressure necessary to precipitate
internal reforms. 225 The Hobbs Act is an important tool for punishing
police corruption in the form of a separate offense or as a predicate offense
under a RICO prosecution, 226 especially in cases of co-conspirator extortion
involving grass-eating police officers like Samuel Ocasio. 227
While some may argue that an expansive interpretation of Section
1951(b)(2) would lead to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, this concern
is not well founded. Sufficient internal institutional checks are already in
place on prosecutorial power in relation to the use of Section 1951(b)(2). 228
The DOJ recognizes that overzealous application of the Hobbs Act may
inspire judicial animosity; therefore, DOJ personnel are encouraged, “to
exercise extreme care in the use of this powerful tool so that its continuing
availability is insured.” 229 To this end, approval of the DOJ Criminal
Division is required for arrests and indictments in Hobbs Act cases that do
not involve violence or force. 230 Therefore, construction of Section
1951(b)(2) as contemplating co-conspirator extortion does not present the
danger of future abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
One may reasonably question whether an expanded reading of the
Hobbs Act extortion provision creates redundancy in the law given that
224. William F. Weld, Introduction, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra
note 17, at i, iv.
225. See Beigel, supra note 214, at 156 (“A police department thoroughly investigated and
scandalized by indictments and convictions of its officers for extensive wrongdoing may be forced
to revise and update its operations and its relationship with the public.”).
226. Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr. & Dennis O. Wilson, Investigation and Prosecution of Police
Corruption Cases, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 17, at 65, 72.
227. See id. (“The Hobbs Act serves as a particularly useful tool in reaching police corruption.
It may serve as a predicate offense under a RICO prosecution or it may be charged as a separate
offense.”).
228. See infra note 225.
229. Radek, supra note 177, app. F at 413, 415.
230. Id. at 421.
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there are other statutes that punish crimes contemplated under the Act.
Where compound offenses are committed, however, ancillary sentence
grading (also known as “piggyback grading”) is usually applied.231 In
addition, deterrence and retribution values inhere in the sentence length for
a crime because punishment extends in proportion to the magnitude of the
offense. 232
2. Congressional Reform Efforts Evidence the Benefits of an
Expansive Interpretation of the Hobbs Act
Congressional efforts to reform federal criminal law also demonstrate
that an expansive interpretation of the Hobbs Act as contemplating coconspirator extortion is justified. In 1966, the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Laws, also known as the Brown Commission, set to
work on creating a draft criminal code. 233 In 1971, the draft federal code
eviscerated the Hobbs Act by treating the crime of extortion under the
Hobbs Act as theft. 234 However, after two years of processing the draft
federal code, the Senate’s final product, S. 1, 235 introduced on January 4,
1973, re-embraced the original language of the Hobbs Act. 236 On March
27, 1973, the DOJ Criminal Code Revision Unit introduced a proposed
alteration of its own in S. 1400 237 that critically removed the “under color of

231. Note, Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 81 YALE L.J. 1209
(1972).
As the Commission notes, there is substantial precedent for piggyback jurisdiction. The
Federal Bank Robbery Act, enacted in 1934, provides for an additional sentence when
the offender assaults, kidnaps, or kills someone ‘in committing’ a bank robbery. . . .
Even stronger precedent for the piggyback provision, though not mentioned by the
Commission, is § 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.
Id. at 1214 (footnotes omitted).
232. McClellan, supra note 195, at 696–97. McClellan notes:
“Piggyback” grading means that crimes against persons and property occurring in the
course of another federal offense become federally prosecutable as related offenses.
This technique may be illustrated by again noting that under present law, as well as the
proposed Code, intimidation of a federal judge is punishable by five [years’]
imprisonment. If the intimidation takes the form of murder, prosecution may be had
under the proposed Code for the ‘murder’ as well as the ‘intimidation.’
Id.
233. THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 285.
234. Id.
235. S. 1, 93d Cong. (1973).
236. See THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 286. Section 2-9C3 of S. 1 provided: “A
person is guilty of extortion if he intentionally obtains services or property of another from
another person, with the consent of the other person, where such consent is induced by wrongful
use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official right.” S. 1, 93d
Cong. § 2-9C3 (1973).
237. S. 1400, 93d Cong. (1973).
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official right” clause of the Hobbs Act. 238 On May 2, 1977, the Senate
introduced S. 1437, which represented a distillation of the three earlier
proposals that importantly included the “under color of official right”
provision. 239 While S. 1437 failed as its antecedents had, Senator Ted
Kennedy attempted to push the Criminal Code Reform Act through by
introducing S. 1722 240 in 1979—a bill identical to S. 1437, and S. 1630 241 in
1981—which merely inserted the word “wrongful” into the Hobbs Act. 242
Significantly, in reviewing this history, no proposed congressional revision
of federal criminal law ever made any indication that co-conspirator
extortion was not contemplated in the original language of the Hobbs Act.
3. An Expansive Construction of the Hobbs Act Does Not Encroach
on Federalism
Interpreting Section 1951(b)(2) to encompass co-conspirator extortion
does not, as some may fear, encroach on federalism. 243 Federal criminal
jurisdiction is utilized for three purposes: (1) to punish criminal matters of
exclusive federal concern, (2) to punish criminal matters that state or local
authorities are incapable of addressing, and (3) to punish noncompliance
with federal administrative regulations.244 These purposes map onto the
“inherent tension between the need to combat official impropriety using the
most effective tools available and the importance of maintaining tradition
state functions.” 245 It is important to remember that the teleological
underpinnings of the Hobbs Act lie in a fundamental mistrust of state
governments’ ability to punish criminal activity contemplated in Section
1951(b)(2) on their own. 246 The address of Representative Joseph R.
Eastman to the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on May 1,
1942, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s widely bemoaned decision in

238. Id. at § 1722(a). Section 1722(a) of S. 1400 provided: “A person is guilty of an offense if
he knowingly obtains property of another by force, or by threatening or placing another person in
fear that any person will be subjected to bodily injury or kidnapping or that any property will be
damaged.” Id.; see also THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 286.
239. “The extortion offense, however, was again simply defined as obtaining property of
another ‘(1) by threatening or placing another person in fear that any person will be subjected to
bodily injury or kidnapping or that any property will be damaged; or (2) under color of official
right.’” THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 287–88.
240. S. 1722, 96th Cong. (1979).
241. S. 1630, 97th Cong. (1981).
242. See THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 290, 296.
243. See, e.g., Evelle J. Younger, State v. Uncle Sam, 58 A.B.A. J. 155, 158 (1972) (“These
federal incursions betray a deep distrust of both local law enforcement and of the ability of local
prosecutors and courts to handle malfeasance when it occurs.”).
244. L. B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 66 (1948).
245. White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law—Extortion, supra note 211, at 262.
246. See infra note 247.
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Local 807, serves to illustrate this point. 247 As Eastman stated: “There
would have been no need for this statute if the local authorities could have
been depended upon to enforce the law . . . the shameful fact seems to be
the local authorities could not be depended upon . . . .”248
While
prosecution of state and local corruption is chiefly the prerogative of state
and local authorities, federal prosecution of state and local corruption is
needed where state and local authorities are incapable of addressing stark or
systemic instances of corruption due their lack of expertise, resources, or
because they are corrupt. 249
4. An Expansive Construction of the Hobbs Act Does Not
Constitute Overcriminalization
The Brown Commission’s raison d’être stemmed from the concern
that the federal criminal code contained superfluous or unnecessary
statutes. 250 As President Johnson stated in a speech on March 9, 1966: “A
number of our criminal laws are obsolete. Many are inconsistent in their
efforts to make the penalty fit the crime. Many—which treat essentially the
same crimes—are scattered in a crazy-quilt patchwork throughout our
criminal code.” 251
Today many continue to complain of overcriminalization, as is illustrated by the suggestion of the Honorable Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, that Congress “[r]epeal three felonies a day
for three years.” 252
In response to this concern, it first must be noted that Section
1951(b)(2) does not render prototypical anti-extortion or anti-bribery
statutes superfluous. The notion that the Hobbs Act is an indispensable
247. Some of the Teamsters Take the Hobbs Act a Little Hard, BALT. SUN, July 6, 1946, at A6.
248. Id.
249. See Hailman, supra note 17, at 17 (“Corruption in state and local government contracts
is, generally speaking, the responsibility of local prosecutors. It becomes of Federal concern,
however, when it either corrupts local law enforcement or becomes so pervasive that local
prosecution can no longer handle it on an individual-case basis. We have seen stark recent
examples of such statewide corruption in Oklahoma, New York and Mississippi, among others.
The positive side is that Federal intervention in those states seems to have been welcomed by local
citizens and, for the most part, has been successful.”); see also THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT
ON POLICE CORRUPTION 256 (1972) (“District attorneys working as closely as they do with police
officers, also tend to be sympathetic to the police. Cases of outright and provable corruption are
customarily pursued with appropriate vigor. However, a district attorney and his assistants, who
work daily with police officers, often find it difficult to believe allegations of corruption among
policemen who are brother officers of the investigators with whom they work. The close
relationship between prosecutors and police also affects public confidence in the district attorneys’
willingness to prosecute policemen. Whether or not the district attorneys are in fact reluctant to
conduct such prosecutions, large segments of the public believe that they are and this inhibits
some people from reporting allegations of police corruption to them.”).
250. George W. Liebmann, Chartering a National Police Force, 56 A.B.A. J. 1070 (1970).
251. Id.
252. Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xliv
(2015), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/06/Kozinski_Preface.pdf.
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anti-corruption tool is expressed in a letter submitted by DOJ Assistant
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, John C. McClellan, on
February 19, 1976:
[C]ontrary to the assumption in the draft Report, the conduct
reached by the “under color of official right” offense would not
be preserved by the possibility of a prosecution for classic
bribery. To establish bribery under section 1351 of S. 1 the
prosecution must show that the defendant public servant accepted
“anything of value in return for an agreement or understanding
that the recipient’s official action as a public servant will be
influenced thereby, or that the recipient will violate a real duty as
public servant.” Proving the existence of such a quid pro quo,
which is the essence of bribery, presents far more difficult
problems of proof than to make out the “under color of official
right” offense. 253
Congress’s continued support for the “under color of official right” clause
of Section 1951(b)(2) throughout its debate for federal criminal law reform
demonstrates that the provision is neither superfluous nor a manifestation of
over-criminalization, but rather is necessary to fight corruption. 254
5. A Broad Construction of Section 1951(b)(2) Will Not Impair Judicial
Economy
It is evident that construing Section 1951(b)(2) to encompass coconspirator extortion will not impair judicial economy by significantly
burdening the caseload of U.S. district courts. The United States
Sentencing Commission report for the Fiscal Year 2004 indicates that only
a bare 1% of guideline defendants in the Fourth Circuit were punished for
racketeering or extortion related offenses, as compared to 0.9%
nationally. 255 The Sentencing Commission’s Report for Fiscal Year 2014
indicates that the share of guideline defendants who have committed
racketeering or extortion related offenses are similarly low: 2.3% for the
Fourth Circuit as compared to 1.1% nationally. 256 Judicial caseload
indicators for fiscal year 2014 illustrate an overall decrease of total criminal
253. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 59th Cong. 9240–41 (1977).
254. See supra notes 232–241 (illustrating the preservation of Section 1951(b)(2) throughout
the Act’s consideration for reform by Congress).
255. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2004,
FOURTH CIRCUIT 3 tbl.1 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2004/4c04.pdf.
256. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2014,
FOURTH CIRCUIT 2 tbl.1 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2014/4c14.pdf.
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cases filed in U.S. district courts from 92,226 in 2005, to 81,226, in 2014 (a
decrease of 11.9%). 257 The number of criminal cases filed in U.S. district
courts for extortion crimes reflects this overall trend, decreasing from 243
in 1995, to 159 in 2013. 258 Additionally, the number of state and local
officials charged by the DOJ’s Public Integrity Section over the past two
decades was consistently low: the total number of those charged in 1995, as
well as in 2014, was approximately 300. 259 In view of these metrics, there
is no statistical basis for a claim that interpreting the Hobbs Act’s extortion
provision as contemplating co-conspirator extortion would increase the
marginal number of federal extortion charges per year sufficient to burden
the economy of the federal judiciary.
V. CONCLUSION
Ocasio v. United States presents the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to reiterate its principles of statutory interpretation and continue
the judiciary’s pattern of broadly construing the Hobbs Act. 260 In view of
the plain and ordinary meaning of the Hobbs Act’s language, as well as the
Act’s legislative history, the Supreme Court should affirm the Fourth
Circuit and uphold Ocasio’s conviction. 261 Important public policy
considerations also militate in favor of a broad construction of the Hobbs
Act as punishing co-conspirator extortion. 262 Political corruption,
particularly police corruption, has, is, and will continue to be, a provocative
flashpoint for public discourse.263 Section 1951(b)(2) of the Hobbs Act
provides the DOJ with a powerful weapon for punishing, and thereby
deterring, corruption. 264 A rule of law stemming from this case that gives
teeth to the “under color of official right” clause of the Hobbs Act facilitates
federal anti-corruption efforts, without unduly burdening judicial economy,
or depriving local authorities of their site-based prerogatives. 265
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